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THE FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
OF SEXTING AT PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
A QUANDARY FOR ADMINISTRATORS
WHO INTERCEPT VISUAL LOVE NOTES
Robert H. Wood*
"Each race determines for itself what indecencies are.
Nature knows no indecencies; man invents them." Mark
Twain
INTRODUCTION
Hypothetical: As a high school administrator, it is your job
to patrol the school corridors to ensure the safety of the students
and to keep order. Between class periods, you notice a group of
male students clustered in the hall laughing raucously at an
image on a cell phone. Because your school has a policy that all
cell phones are to be turned off during school hours, you step
into the group, take custody of the student's cell phone and
direct the student to join you in the principal's office. As you
walk the student to the office, you look at the cell phone and see
the image of a female student at the school clad only in her
*Assistant Professor, Criminal Justice and Legal Studies Department,
University of Central Florida, teaching in the areas of Administrative Law,
Entertainment Law and World Legal Studies. Education: B.F.A., North
Carolina School of the Arts, 1977; J.D., Georgia State University College of
Law, 1992; LL.M. (with Distinction), Tulane Law School, 1993. Licensed to
practice in Louisiana and Virginia. The author wishes to thank Jonathan
Sabin, Editor-in-Chief, and Lauren Numeroff, Executive Articles &
Symposia Editor, at the Journal of Law and Policy for their invaluable
insights during the editing of this article.
' MARK TWAIN, NOTEBOOK 288 (Albert Bigelow Paine ed., Cooper
Square Publishers 1972) (1896).
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underpants with her breasts exposed. What do you do?
Possible responses: (a) ignore the photo because it is not
your concern what images are on the phone, only that the phone
was turned on during school hours; (b) tell the student that he
must delete the photo and either attend a seminar concerning the
risks of teenage pregnancy, for example, or be charged with
possession of child pornography; (c) upload the image to your
computer to save it as evidence, delete the image on the
student's cell phone and tell him not to do it again; or (d) turn
the phone over to the district attorney for filing of criminal
charges against the student.
• 2
From an analysis of news stories on this subject, most
administrators faced with similar situations have chosen option
(d)-hand the student and his cell phone over to the district
attorney, which is essentially a zero tolerance approach to
possession of sexual material in school.3
During 2008 and 2009, a number of teenagers were brought
up on child pornography charges as the result of an increasingly
popular method of flirting amongst high school students called
"sexting." 4 This term is defined as "the practice of sending or
posting sexually suggestive text messages and images, including
nude or semi-nude photographs, via cellular phones or over theinternet. "'
The debate over whether child pornography charges are
applicable to minors who self produce the images is the subject
for another article.6 However, because sexting is often detected
2 See infra note 15.
3 See infra Part IV for the author's answer to the hypothetical.
4 Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
I d. at 637 (internal quotations omitted); see also http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Sexting#cite-note-20.
6 L. Steven Grasz & Patrick J. Pfaltzgraff, Child Pornography and
Child Nudity: Why and How States May Constitutionally Regulate the
Production, Possession, and Distribution of Nude Visual Depictions of
Children, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 609, 625-26 (1998); Robert H. Wood, The
Failure of Sexting Criminalization: A Plea for Prosecutorial Restraint, 16
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2009); see also Mary
Graw Leary, Self-Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate Societal
Response to Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. I
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by school administrators who discover the photographs on
student cell phones, the question naturally arises whether and to
what extent students have a right to engage in this behavior, and
the appropriate response for school officials who discover the
materials. Instead of weighing the students' First Amendment
rights under applicable Supreme Court precedents, many school
administrators turn over the confiscated material to local
prosecutors who charge the students under state child
pornography laws (provided the photos are of students under
eighteen). In some cases, the students are branded as sex
offenders-a stigma they will likely carry for most of their lives.
In essence, the zero tolerance approach to teenage sexuality as
expressed through sexting has had dreadful consequences for
those students unfortunate enough to get caught.
This Article analyzes the First Amendment implications of
this type of student speech and concludes that when balancing
the competing interests of school discipline and the constitutional
rights of minors, school administrators should accord greatest
weight to students' First Amendment rights. By doing so, school
administrators will protect minors from the uncertain fates of the
criminal justice system where child pornography laws often
punish sexting by minors.
Part I of this Article presents some circumstances under
which the sexting phenomenon has occurred. Part II analyzes
jurisprudence relating to student speech protections. Part III
examines judicial limitations on a minor's constitutional right to
produce, possess, or view sexually oriented materials. Part IV
applies First Amendment principles to the public school student
in the sexting context to conclude that zero tolerance to sexting
by school administrators is an inappropriate and disproportionate
response to adolescent exploration and expression of sexuality.
I. THE RISE OF SEXTING
The national attention given to sexting can be traced in part
(2007); Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to
Professor Leary, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 505 (2008).
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to an online survey conducted by the National Campaign to
Prevent Teen Pregnancy in partnership with Cosmogirl.com in
the fall of 2008.' This survey of 653 teens found that twenty
percent of teens between thirteen and nineteen had sent or posted
nude or semi-nude photos or video of themselves.8 Of young
adults between twenty and twenty-six years old, thirty-three
percent had sexted. 9
The survey also sought to explain why teenagers and young
adults are engaged in this activity and the answers were quite
predictable: flirting and peer-pressure. t° Seventy-one percent of
teen girls and sixty-seven percent of teen boys sent or posted the
material to a boyfriend or girlfriend, while twenty-one percent
of teen girls and thirty-nine percent of teen boys sent the content
to someone they wanted to date or "hook up with."" The most
common reasons cited by teens for sending sexually suggestive
content were to be "fun or flirtatious," to give someone a "sexy
present," to "feel sexy," or as a joke. 2 Many of the teens
responded that they felt pressured by friends or the opposite sex
to send sexual content. 3
' THE NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED
PREGNANCY, SEX AND TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND
YOUNG ADULTS, available at http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/
PDF/SexTechSummary.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Sexting
Survey].
8 Id. at 1.
9 Id.; see also Kim Zetter, Survey: One-Third of Youths Engage in
Sexting, WIRED.COM, (Dec. 3, 2009) http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2009/12/sexting-survey/.
'0 Id. at 4.
" Id. at 2. The term "hook up with" is considered slang for anything
ranging from meeting with someone, to dating, to having casual sex without
strings, depending on the context in which it is used. See Fluther.com, What
Does the Phrase "Hook up" Mean to You?, http://www.fluther.com/disc/
30292/what-does-the-phrase-hook-up-mean-to-you/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
,2 Sexting Survey, supra note 7, at 4.
13 Id. The use of modem technology to capture risqu6 material is not a
novel concept to lawmakers. It is illegal to use digital media to take pictures
of the "private areas" of people, particularly women, without their consent
under the Video Voyeurism Act of 2004. This Act provides for the
imposition of a fine and/or up to one year imprisonment for anyone who "has
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Even though sexting is typically voluntary at first, the
transmission of nude photographs triggers a host of legal and
societal concerns, such as the application of child pornography
laws when the creator or possessor of visual images is under
eighteen. Such was the case in a number of state jurisdictions.' 4
Many of these incidents occurred when teachers or school
administrators confiscated cell phones and subsequently
discovered the photos. 5
The most publicized sexting case began in October 2008 and
involved a Pennsylvania high school where school administrators
the intent to capture an image of the private area of an individual without
their consent, and knowingly does so under circumstances in which the
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 1801
(2006). This statute resulted from the practice of "upskirting," whereby
voyeurs would use cell phone cameras or other portable camera devices to
capture the image of "the naked or undergarment clad genitals, pubic area,
buttocks, or female breast . . ." of a person without her knowledge, typically
in public places. Id. at § 1801(b)(3); see also Lance E. Rothenberg, Re-
Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and Failure of the Criminal
Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space,
49 AM. U. L. REV. 1127 (2000).
"4 See Peter Cumming, Address Before the Congress of Humanities and
Social Sciences: Children's Rights, Children's Voices, Children's
Technology, Children's Sexuality (May 26, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.arts.yorku.ca/huma/cummingp/documents/TeenSextingbyPeterCu
mmingMay262009.pdf) (summarizing the various cases arising in the United
States).
15 Shaun Davies, Kids Face Porn Charges Over Sexting, 9NEWS, Jan.
17, 2009, http://news.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=719928 (describing
event where teacher confiscated student's cell phone for use during school
hours and found explicit photos); Teen Sexting Worries Parents, Schools,
CBSNEWS.COM, Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/04/
tech/main4776708.shtml (describing event where high school staff found nude
cell phone photos after a 15-year-old girl sent them to classmates); Castalia
Police Look into Complaint of Nude Photos Sent by Cell Phone,
SANDUSKYREGISTER.COM, Mar. 20, 2009, http://www.sanduskyregister.com/
articles/2009/03/19/front/1232333.txt (describing conflict between teen couple
where boyfriend circulated nude photos of girlfriend after an argument); Two
Mason Teenagers Charged in Sexting Case, WLWT.CoM, Mar. 4, 2009,
http://www.wlwt.com/news/18855563/detail.html (describing instance where
administrators confiscated a boy's cell phone during class and found nude
pictures of 15-year-old female classmates).
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confiscated the cell phones of several male students who were
using them during school hours.' 6 The administrators then
discovered on the cell phones pictures of "scantily clad, semi-
nude and nude teenage girls," some of whom were enrolled in
the school district.17 The school officials turned the phones over
to the local district attorney, who began a criminal investigation
that eventually led to the threatened prosecution of over twenty
high school students on child pornography charges. Eventually,
the parents of all but three of the teenagers agreed to submit
their children to a "re-education" program, in addition to six
months of probation and drug testing, in exchange for leniency.' 8
The parents of the three remaining female students refused to
consent to the plea arrangement on the grounds that the
photographs of their daughters did not constitute child
pornography. 19
One of the photographs at issue depicted two 13-year-old
girls from the waist up clad in opaque white brassieres. One girl
was pictured talking on the phone, while the other flashed a
peace sign. 0 The third girl was shown in a second photo having
stepped out of the shower, with a towel wrapped around her just
under her breasts. Neither photograph depicted any sexual
activity or exposed any genitalia.2' Further, the pictures were
taken by a third person who sent them to other students without
the girls' permission." Nevertheless, the prosecutor asserted that
the girls were accessories to the production of child pornography
under Pennsylvania law because one girl was partially nude and
the others had posed "provocatively." 23
The parents contacted the American Civil Liberties Union,
16 Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2009)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Complaint, Miller v. Skumanick, 605
F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2009)).
17 id.
s Id. at 638.
19 Id. at 638-39.
20 Id. at 639.
21 id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 638.
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who represented them in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
seeking a temporary restraining order from the federal district
court to enjoin the prosecutor from bringing criminal charges
against their daughters.24 Of particular interest was the plaintiffs'
claim that forcing the children to enter a re-education program,
where they would be required to write an essay on the errors of
their ways, was government compelled speech in violation of the
First Amendment.25 In holding that the girls had asserted a
constitutionally protected activity sufficient to succeed on the
merits at trial, the district court recognized that not only does
the First Amendment prevent the government from restricting or
suppressing speech, it also prevents the government from
"compelling individuals to express certain views." 26 If the
government takes "action that forces a private speaker to
propagate a particular message chosen by the government" it
results in compelled speech in violation of the First
Amendment.27
In this case, the court believed that the girls made a valid
argument that they had not violated the law, and that being
forced to write an essay admitting wrongdoing required them to
express a belief they did not hold. The re-education program
therefore violated their right to be free of government compelled
speech.28 The judge withheld judgment on the merits of the
plaintiffs' claims that the photographs did not constitute child
pornography under Pennsylvania law. Rather, the court merely
indicated that the plaintiffs were reasonably likely to succeed on
24 id.
25 Id. The plaintiffs asserted that the district attorney's threats constituted
retaliatory prosecution in that the girls had a constitutional right to avoid
taking the courses. The district attorney responded by threatening to take
adverse action, and because the pictures were not child pornography, the
protected activity caused the retaliatory action. Id. at 643 (citing Eichenlaub
v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004)).
26 Id. at 644 (quoting Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v.
Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)).
27 Id. (quoting Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 390 F. 3d at
236).
" id. at 645-47.
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the merits, which was the evaluative standard for issuing a
temporary restraining order. 29 As a result of the court's analysis
of the plaintiffs' claims, it issued the temporary restraining order
against the district attorney.30
The panic over sexting has not only affected students, but
has also impacted teachers and administrators. For example, a
school administrator was charged with possession of child
pornography after he caught a male student with the semi-nude
picture of a female classmate on a cell phone. The administrator
ordered the student to send him a copy to hold as evidence
before it was deleted from the phone. 31 After a subsequent sex-
related misadventure involving the student, his mother was
informed of the earlier incident. She became irate that she was
not told and complained to the police, who found the picture on
the administrator's computer. The administrator was eventually
brought up on felony charges, but a judge later dismissed the
case on the grounds that the picture did not constitute child
pornography.32 Although this was an unusual occurrence, it
highlights the difficulties administrators face when confronted
with the discovery of risqu& photographs on student cell phones.
Sexting in public schools raises new questions under the
29 Id. at 645. The court relied on factors set forth by the Third Circuit
for consideration of a motion for preliminary injunction established in
Crissman v. Dover Downs Entertainment, Inc., 239 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir.
2001).
30 Id. at 647. The district court's decision was upheld by the Third
Circuit in Miller v. Mitchell, No. 09-2144, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5501
(3d. Cir. March 17, 2010). The court of appeals held that the plaintiffs were
entitled to a preliminary injunction because the future prosecution of the
plaintiffs in retaliation for their refusal to participate in the re-education
program would violate the student's First Amendment right to be free from
government coerced speech and the parent's Fourteenth Amendment right to
control the upbringing of their children. Id. at 25, 35.
31 Kim Zetter, "Sexting" Hysteria Falsely Brands Educator as Child
Pornographer, WIRED.COM, Apr. 3, 2009, available at http://www.wired.
com/threatlevel/2009/04/sexting-hysteri/; see also supra Introduction (setting
forth option (c) as a possible response to the hypothetical proposing a nearly
identical situation).
32 Zetter, supra note 31.
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First Amendment concerning the extent of a student's right to
freedom of expression in the public schools.
II. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING MINORS'
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The United States Supreme Court has long wrestled with
applying the Bill of Rights to minors.33 The Court has held that
minors enjoy many of the same constitutional rights as adults in
the contexts of equal protection34 and due process," as well as
substantive and procedural rights in juvenile courts.36 Further,
minors have also been recognized as having a right of sexual
privacy in the contexts of abortion and contraception. 7
However, the freedom of expression for students in the public
school setting remains an area in which the rights of minors are
limited. The first of several Supreme Court cases on the subject
seemed to provide a level of protection consonant with rights of
adults, but later decisions steadily retreated from that viewpoint.
Today, free speech rights of students are better defined by the
exceptions created by later Supreme Court decisions than the
rule favoring First Amendment protection.
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District
In 1969, at the height of public debate over the Vietnam
conflict, the Supreme Court handed down its first decision
confronting student speech rights.38 In Tinker, three students
planned to wear black armbands at school to protest the Vietnam
" See Emily Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, 48 BUFF. L. REV.
785, 794 (2000).
14 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975).
36 See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
37 Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)
(finding unconstitutional a state law requirement that minors under the age of
eighteen must obtain parental consent before undergoing an abortion).
38 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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War. However, the school administration heard of their plans
and issued an order forbidding the wearing of armbands at
school and threatened suspension for any student who refused to
comply.39 The three students ignored the administration's order
and were accordingly suspended after they refused to remove the
armbands at school. An action against the school district shortly
followed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking an injunction
and nominal damages. 4°
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice
Fortas, held that First Amendment rights were available to
teachers and students, who did not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.",4' The Court did not recognize an unlimited right to
freedom of expression for students: conduct that "materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others" was not protected speech.42 The Court
observed, however, that "personal intercommunication among
the students" was an integral part of the school experience and
should not be unduly restricted unless it caused a material and
substantial disruption in the discipline necessary to the operation
of the school. 43 The students at issue had engaged in "pure"
speech that had not caused disruption in the classroom or
elsewhere and that speech was entitled to "comprehensive
protection" by the First Amendment. 44
'9 Id. at 504.
4 id.
41 Id. at 506.
42 Id. at 512.
43 Id. at 512, n.6 (citing Hammond v. South Carolina State Coll., 272 F.
Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967) (observing that a school is not a public institution
like a hospital or jail, but a public place where students are entitled to
express their views).
" Id. at 505-06. While Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment, he did
not share in the belief that the First Amendment rights of children and adults
were the same outside the context of school discipline. He noted, for
example, that the Court had decided just one term prior that children did not
have the same First Amendment rights as adults when it came to sexually
explicit publications. Id. at 515 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968)) (finding that a "variable obscenity" standard applied to minors when
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It would be seventeen years before another case on school
speech came before the Court and the seemingly broad rule of
Tinker would be circumscribed in the face of indecent speech.
B. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
At issue in Fraser was a high school student who addressed
a student assembly to advocate on behalf of a fellow student
running for elective office. 45 During this school-sponsored event,
the student described the candidate in sexually laden innuendo.
Students in the audience responded with reactions ranging from
laughter to embarrassment.46 The speaker was subsequently
suspended for three days and removed from the list of potential
student commencement speakers, having been found to be in
violation of a school disciplinary rule prohibiting obscene or
profane language.47
The Supreme Court took this opportunity to fashion an
exception to the relatively broad Tinker rule of protecting
student speech by holding that the speech at issue in Fraser was
evaluating their right to view sexual materials that were not obscene as to
adults). See infra Part HI for discussion of Ginsberg. Justice Black furiously
dissented, stating that it was "a myth to say that any person has a
constitutional right to say what he pleases, where he pleases, and when he
pleases." Id. at 522. Further, he asserted that the Court was handing control
of the school system over to the students and that school discipline would
suffer accordingly. Id. at 524-25.
45 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986).
Id. at 678. Excerpts from the speech are as follows:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his
shirt, his character is firm-but most of all, his belief in you, the
students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his
point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to
the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing
and pushing until, finally-he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go
the very end-even the climax, for each and every one of you. So
vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between
you and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4I Id. at 678.
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"lewd and obscene," and therefore undeserving of First
Amendment protection." In an opinion authored by Chief Justice
Burger, the Court observed that one of the missions of public
school education was to instill "fundamental values" such as
"habits and manners of civility. 49
Noting that even members of Congress had rules prohibiting
the use of "indecent language,"5 ° the Court found it no less
appropriate that public schools could impose similar limits on
student speech. Even though adults might not otherwise be
censored for offensive political speech in public places, students
did not have constitutional rights that are "co-extensive with the
rights of adults in other settings."" For example, the Court
noted its previous decision, Ginsberg v. New York, which held
that a state could ban the sale of sexually oriented materials to
minors even though the First Amendment protected their sale to
adults. 3 Further, the court previously held in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation that the Federal Communications Commission could
regulate "indecent," but not "obscene," radio broadcasts,
because the program was aired at a time when children were in
the audience 4 Finally, the Court had already recognized that
minors had more restricted rights under the First Amendment
than adults as to sexual content, which justified the imposition of
48 Id. at 680.
49 Id. at 681.
'0 Id. at 681-82 (citing Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice
adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives, which prohibits the use of
"impertinent" speech and "indecent language" in House proceedings).
5 Id. at 683.
12 Id. at 682. The Court differentiated between the adult defendant in
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), who wore a jacket inscribed "Fuck
the Draft" in a courthouse, and students using similar language in a school
setting.
" Id. at 684 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the
same case at the focus of Justice Stewart's concurrence in Tinker, where he
wrote separately to reassert that children do not have the same constitutional
rights as adults in all areas, such as sexually oriented materials) see supra
Part II.A; see also infra Part III (discussing Ginsberg).
'4 Id. at 684-85 (citing F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726
(1978)).
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penalties for the student's "vulgar and lewd speech" particularly
when the comments were unrelated to any political discourse."
C. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier.
Within two years, the issue of student speech was back
before the Court, this time as a result of the contents of a
student newspaper. In Kuhlmeier, the student newspaper decided
to publish an article on three high school students' experiences
with pregnancy, and another article on the impact of divorce on
students at the school.56 The high school principal, who reviewed
the paper prior to publication, was concerned that the article on
pregnancy did not adequately protect the identity of the students
involved, and that it contained references to birth control and
sexual activity that was inappropriate for younger students. 7
Further, he was concerned that the article on divorce contained
negative comments by a student about her father, who the
principal believed should have been given an opportunity to
respond. 8 Accordingly, he directed that the articles be deleted
from the paper.59
A five justice majority of the Supreme Court decided that the
student newspaper could not be properly categorized as a
"forum for public expression" deserving First Amendment
protection. Rather, such a forum was only created when school
facilities were opened to use by the general public. 6° The student
newspaper was produced by a journalism class under the
direction of a teacher, and as such, was a supervised curricular
activity subject to reasonable regulation by school authorities.6'
The Court therefore found the Tinker standard inapplicable,
because the issue was not whether a school could restrict an
individual student's speech content, but instead concerned
" Id. at 685.
56 Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988).
57 Id.
58 Id.
" Id. at 264.
60 Id. at 267.
61 Id. at 270.
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"whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to
promote particular student speech." 62 School-sponsored activities
such as newspapers and plays were associated with the school,
rather than to the viewpoint of a particular student, and
educators could therefore exercise greater control over student
expression through supervised curricular activity, even if it did
not take place in the traditional classroom setting .63 Accordingly,
the Court held that educators had a greater degree of control
over student speech in school-sponsored activities as long as
their restrictions were based on legitimate "pedagogical
concerns.
D. Morse v. Frederick.
The Court did not reexamine the issue of student speech for
another nineteen years. When it did in 2007, another divided
Court imposed an additional limitation on the Tinker standard.65
In Morse, the Olympic Torch Relay was scheduled to pass in
front of a high school in Juneau, Alaska, on its way to the
Olympic winter games in Salt Lake City, Utah. 66 The students
62 Id. at 270-71.
63 Id. at 271.
64 Id. at 273. In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by two other justices,
bemoaned the majority's unwarranted abandonment of the Tinker standard,
concluding that the Court had never previously distinguished between a
student's expression of a personal viewpoint during school hours and
expression during a school-sponsored event. Justice Brennan categorized the
principal's justifications for deleting the articles as motivated by a desire to
suppress viewpoints he deemed too controversial for a school newspaper. The
First Amendment, he said, would not permit such "viewpoint discrimination"
and the Tinker standard only allowed schools to restrict student speech in the
case of disruption or interference with the rights of others. No such showing
was evident in this case. Id. at 282-83, 288 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 395 (2007). Although Chief Justice
Roberts managed to command a majority consisting of Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Breyer, separate concurrences were issued by
Justices Thomas, Alito, and Breyer, who also dissented in part. Stevens'
dissent was joined by Justices Souter and Ginsberg.
66 Id. at 397.
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were allowed out of class to watch the procession as part of a
school approved and supervised social event. As the torch
bearers and camera crews filming the event passed in front of
the school, a group of students unfurled a fourteen foot banner
that read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS," which was visible to
students on the opposite side of the street. The principal, Morse,
ran across the street and demanded that it be taken down. One
student, Frederick, refused to comply, but the principal
confiscated the banner and later suspended Frederick for ten
67days on the grounds that the banner promoted illegal drug use.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court that it was
consistent with the First Amendment for a high school principal
to restrict student speech during school activities if that speech
"is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use."
68
The Court analyzed the prior student speech cases in order to
emphasize that the speech protected in Tinker was political in
nature, and was "at the core of what the First Amendment is
designed to protect. 6 9 The Court then addressed the finding in
Fraser, that "offensively lewd and indecent speech" was
undeserving of First Amendment protections. Although the
Court was puzzled by the "mode of analysis" used by the Fraser
Court, two principles emerged: (1) students and adults do not
have co-extensive rights, and (2) the "mode of analysis"
employed by the Tinker court was not the sole method of
analyzing student speech.7 ° Finally, the Court cited Kuhlmeier as
confirming the Court's interpretation of Fraser: schools may
regulate speech used in schools, even though that speech would
otherwise be protected in the public arena, and Tinker is not the
67 Id. at 397-98.
68 Id. at 403. The majority recognized that a problematic factual issue
was the meaning of the phrase on Frederick's banner, which the student
maintained was pure nonsense only designed to attract the cameras so he
could appear on television. Although the Court found the message to be
"cryptic," it was nevertheless considered reasonable for the principal to
interpret the "bong hits" reference as being a pro-drug message. Id. at 401.
69 Id. at 403 (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003)).
70 Id. at 404-05 (citing Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
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sole basis for student speech restrictions."
Having demonstrated that Tinker may arguably apply only to
political speech, the Court turned to the import of the message
on Frederick's banner. The Court declined to extend the ruling
in Fraser to include any speech that was offensive.
Nevertheless, the banner did appear to promote illegal drug use,
which the Court described as a serious national problem-one
which school principals are justified in suppressing at school
events when student speech appears to promote or condone drug
usage. The principal was therefore justified in suppressing the
student's expression.
" Id. at 405 (citing Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263
(1988)).
72 Id. at 409-10. Justice Thomas concurred with the holding that schools
could suppress speech advocating drug usage, but on the grounds that the rule
in Tinker had no constitutional basis. Id. at 410 (Thomas, J., concurring). In
a classic originalist interpretation, Justice Thomas drew a bright line between
the First Amendment and student speech, based on the history of public
school education in the United States beginning in colonial times. For a
spirited refutation of originalism, see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is
Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (2009). According to Justice Thomas, students
did not historically enjoy any speech rights in public schools until the Court's
ruling in Tinker, and the only limitation on the ability of administrators to
enforce school discipline came in the context of corporal punishment that was
"clearly excessive." Rather, the doctrine of in loco parentis historically gave
administrators unrestricted license to control the conduct of students entrusted
to their care. Accordingly, he would have overruled Tinker and returned to a
policy of complete deference to the decisions of school administrators.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 410-22. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy in
concurrence, stated that they joined the majority only for its reaffirmation of
the Tinker standard, and that the majority opinion was limited to holding that
(1) public schools could restrict speech that could plausibly be interpreted as
advocating use of illegal drugs, and (2) a restriction of speech directed to
political or social issues such as "the wisdom of the war on drugs or of
legalizing marijuana for medicinal use," was unsupportable. Id. at 422 (Alito,
J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissent characterized the banner message as
nonsensical-ambiguous at best-and as directed by students to a television
camera crew rather than to other students. Although he agreed that the
principal should have been shielded from liability, Justice Stevens believed
the disciplinary measures employed were uncalled for in light of the fact that
the banner "contained [merely] an oblique reference to drugs." In his
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E. The Remains of Tinker after Morse: The Boundaries of
Minors' Free Expression Rights in School.
In the aftermath of the Court's decision in Morse, the Tinker
standard still remains, although not entirely intact. While critics
have suggested that the Court has implicitly abandoned Tinker,
leaving no "comprehensive First Amendment approach to public
education,"73 the Court has yet to explicitly abandon the Tinker
approach, choosing to carve out exceptions on a case by case
basis. Given the Court's continued reliance on Tinker, it is still
fair to say that "pure speech" by students with an overtly
political message, whether it occurs in the classroom, on school
grounds or during school-sponsored activities, receives the
Court's highest level of protection unless it "materially disrupts
classwork or involves disorder or invasion of the rights of
others . ... "74
However, the school can still place limitations on the content
of speech if it is deemed "vulgar and offensive" or "sexually
explicit, indecent or lewd . . . . " Further, expression regarding
politically sensitive topics such as teen pregnancy and the effect
of divorce on teens can be suppressed if it is made in the context
of school-sponsored events, such as student newspapers or
school plays, where the message might be interpreted as
sanctioned by the school.76 In that case, an administrator's
actions to curb such expression would be considered "reasonably
opinion, the message on the banner neither violated any rule nor advocated
illegal conduct. Accordingly, the student's First Amendment rights had been
violated. Justice Stevens stated that the fact that the banner contained a
reference to "drug paraphernalia," was no justification for abandoning the
rule of Tinker, which required a showing of disruption to the school's
operation or some interference with the rights of others. There was no such
showing in the present circumstances. Id. at 434-38.
71 Curtis G. Bentley, Student Speech in Public Schools: A Comprehensive
Analytical Framework Based on the Role of Public Schools in Democratic
Education, 2009 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 1, 34-35 (2009).
7' Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969).
" Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683-84 (1986).
76 Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
JOURNAL OF LA W AND POLICY
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."" Finally, schools
are free to limit speech reasonably seen as promoting illegal
78drug use at school events.
F. Criticism Abounds
The foregoing summary of student speech rights
demonstrates that school administrators might reasonably be
confused when deciding what constitutes permissible student
conduct. As Justice Alito remarked: "Teachers are neither
lawyers nor police officers; and the law should not demand that
they fully understand the intricacies of our First Amendment
jurisprudence. , 79 It is not surprising, then, that legal scholars
have offered alternatives to Tinker and its progeny. The Court's
decision in Morse ° has generated scholarly commentary as
divergent as the opinions of those justices who confronted the
issue of student speech rights.
One former public school teacher sided with Justice Thomas
in arguing that the Tinker doctrine should be abandoned in favor
of a policy of deference to the policies and decisions of school
administrators.l Instead of recognizing a presumptive protection
of student speech, subject to the "ad hoc exceptions" of Fraser,
Kuhlmeier and Morse, Jay Braiman suggests that there be a
"presumption of reasonableness" for school disciplinary policies,
with the burden of proof placed on the student to prove
otherwise.2 Finally, Braiman recommends that private law
principles of tort and contract law, rather than constitutional
doctrine, should govern the relationship between students and
school officials. 3
77 Id.
78 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007).
79 Id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring).
8 See supra Part II.D.
8' Jay Braiman, Note, A New Case, an Old Problem, a Teacher's
Perspective: The Constitutional Rights of Public School Students, 74 BROOK.
L. REv. 439 (2009).
82 Id. at 469.
3 Id. at 476.
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Another commentator agrees that the courts should defer to
the actions of school officials by adopting a presumption of
constitutionality.' 4 Curtis Bentley recognizes that the First
Amendment is applicable to student speech, but argues that
constitutional protection should only be afforded to the extent
necessary to protect the "public school's role in democratic
education." 5 He defines this role as "the inculcation in young
students of the essential democratic values of nonrepression and
nondiscrimination." 6 Essentially, Bentley advocates a bright line
test in favor of judicial protection only for political speech, with
the burden shifted to the student to prove that the regulation of
student speech would not serve the school's educational role in a
democracy: the "preparation of citizens to be effective and
responsible civil participants." 87
One intriguing view of the Morse decision proposes to
abandon Tinker and its progeny in favor of a "relaxed
Brandenburg application.""8 Recall that the dissent in Morse
argued that the promotion of illegal drug use was not one of the
categories of speech left unprotected by the constitution, such as
"incitement to imminent lawless action" prohibited by the
Supreme Court's decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio.8 9 Even
though neither the dissent nor the majority in Morse suggested
that Brandenburg was the appropriate test to be applied to
student speech, Steven Penaro argues that a modified version
should apply to student speech in the school context. 90 While a
strict application of Brandenburg would require that the
government prove the speaker "intend[ed] to incite an imminent
unlawful act" and such an act immediately followed,9' Penaro
8 Bentley, supra note 73, at 35.
85 Id. at 3-4.
86 id.
17 Id. at 32, 35.
'8 Steven Penaro, Reconciling Morse with Brandenburg, 77 FORDHAM L.
REv. 251, 278 (2008) (emphasis added).
89 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 436 (2007) (quoting Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969)).
'0 Penaro, supra note 88, at 269.
9' Id. at 266.
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argues that because these elements are difficult to prove, the
strict application of the Brandenburg test would provide nearly
unlimited protection under the First Amendment.92 Instead, he
suggests relaxing the requirement of imminence for both the
"intent and effects prongs" of the Brandenburg test to both
protect student speech under the First Amendment and give
school officials the ability to sustain an orderly environment. 
9 3
The Morse decision has also been criticized for failing to
assist school administrators in resolving the issue of "where, for
free-speech purposes, the school stops and the public square
begins., 94 In Richard Garnett's view, the Court has never
directly addressed a key issue in the debate over free speech
rights: boundaries of what may serve as the "basic educational
mission" of the public school system. 95 This is an important
question as the Courts have long justified restriction of minor
speech based on the "special characteristics of the school
environment," 96 but the Court has failed to provide any in-depth
explanation of these special characteristics. 97 To fill this void,
Garnett describes public schools as "government-run institutions,
charged with forming and shaping students' values, loyalties,
commitments and manners."" While universities might be
considered "First Amendment institutions" which "play a
significant role in contributing to public discourse," Garnett
argues that public schools on the kindergarten through secondary
levels would more properly be categorized as "anti-First
Amendment-or, perhaps, pre-First Amendment-institutions"
where the government must take on a more "managerial" role to
fulfill its mission of preparing children to be good citizens later
9 id.
9' Id. at 286.
9 Richard W. Garnett, Symposium, Speech and the Public Schools after
Morse v. Frederick: Can There Really Be "Free Speech" in Public Schools?,
12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 45, 46 (2008).
Id. at 47.
Id. at 51 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
Id. at 47.
9I Id. at 55.
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in life. 99
The difficulty with the Tinker alternatives proposed above is
the overwhelming deference given to school administrators in
deciding the limits of permissible student speech, reminiscent of
the positions of Justice Black in Tinker'04 and Justice Thomas in
Morse.'' These approaches are also problematic in that they give
school officials such wide latitude in instilling the "fundamental
values" such as "habits and manners of civility" that was the
Court's objective in Fraser.2 Whose values? Whose habits? One
senses the imposition of majoritarian values and habits-a
tendency in government institutions that the First Amendment is
supposed to prevent.0 3 Furthermore, these suggested frameworks
fail to take into account the constitutional protections of human
sexuality. 04 However, sexual expression seems to be at the low
end of the constitutional spectrum for minors in the First
Amendment context, as demonstrated by Fraser and Kuhimeier.
Considering that decisions related to sex and reproduction are
treated by the court as fundamental liberties for adults,' 5 it is
paradigmatic that minors are treated differently than adults by
99 Id. at 58-59.
,00 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524-25 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that giving
students First Amendment guarantees is tantamount to surrendering control of
the schools to students).
'0' Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410-11 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the First Amendment was never understood to
protect student speech from a historical perspective).
'02 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)
(quoting Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
103 Id. at 689-90 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("School officials do not have
limitless discretion to apply their own notions of indecency. Courts have a
First Amendment responsibility to insure that robust rhetoric is not
suppressed by prudish failures to distinguish the vigorous from the vulgar.")
(citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Central School Dist., 607 F.2d
1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979)).
"m The sexual privacy interest of married couples has been recognized by
the Court as a fundamental right in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). This protection has been extended to the context of abortion by Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and to the context of homosexuality by
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
105 See id.
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the Court when it comes to the extent of their right to express
themselves when that expression relates to sex. This is
problematic when applying the First Amendment to expression
that involves sexting.
III. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON A MINOR'S RIGHT TO SEXUAL
EXPRESSION
Adults may freely purchase and trade pornographic material
that does not rise to the level of "obscenity" under the Miller
test,' °6 and any governmental restriction in this area will be
subject to the Court's strict scrutiny test: the governmental
interest must be compelling and it must choose the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest. '°7 However, a
different standard applies to minors.
The seminal case relating to the First Amendment rights of
minors in the context of sexually explicit material is Ginsberg v.
New York.' °8 Ginsburg impacted juvenile rights in two ways:
(1) it adopted the more relaxed rational relationship standard for
analyzing statutes seeking to protect minors from exposure to
sexual materials; and (2) it endorsed the variable obscenity
doctrine so that minors can be shielded from speech that would
otherwise be protected under the First Amendment as to adults.
In Ginsberg a store owner was convicted for violating a New
York criminal obscenity law that prohibited the sale of "harmful
materials" to minors under seventeen.' °9 The harmful materials
were defined by the statute as "any picture, photograph,
'0 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) inquires:
"(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." Id. at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
'07 Sable Communications of Cal. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 125-26
(1989).
108 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
109 See id. at 631-32 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h).
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drawing, sculpture, motion picture film or similar visual
representation or image of a person or portion of the human
body which depicts nudity [or] sexual conduct . . . when it
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid
interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the adult community . . . and (iii) is utterly without
redeeming social importance for minors. ""
A sixteen year old boy was sent by his mother to the store
owner's lunch counter on Long Island to buy "girlie magazines"
so she could make a complaint to the police."' The Court upheld
the shop owner's conviction by examining the facial validity of
the statute, which created an obscenity as to minors standard,
even though the same material would not necessarily be
considered obscene as to adults."' The Court explicitly
recognized that the types of pictures contained in the magazines
were not "obscene" for adults under a long line of cases
previously decided by the Court."3
The Court then embraced the concept that the definition of
obscenity might vary according to the group of persons the state
sought to protect from harm. Because it was already established
that the state had an "exigent interest" in protecting the "health,
safety, welfare and morals of its community," materials the state
found only suitable for adults could be considered obscene for
the purposes of restricting their distribution to children. "
4
The Court further justified its adoption of the variable
obscenity standard on the grounds that although decisions
regarding the exposure of children to sexually related materials
were primarily within the scope of parental authority, the state
also had an "independent interest in the well-being of its
"0 Id. at 645-47 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h(l)(f)).
... Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 671-72 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 631.
Id. at 634-35 n.3.
I" d. at 636 (citing Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 218 N.E.2d 668 (2d Cir.
1966); see also id. at 636 n.4 (citing William B. Lockhart & Robert C.
McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards,
45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960), which set forth the "variable obscenity" standard
now embraced by the Court).
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youth."" 5 This interest justified the state in protecting children
from such materials even though adults could not be similarly
restricted. 116
Furthermore, because obscenity was not constitutionally
protected speech," 7 the Court did not apply the strict scrutiny
test normally employed in First Amendment analysis." 8 Rather,
in determining the statute's validity, the Court addressed the
issue of whether the statute was rationally related to the state's
interest in preventing the harm caused to children by exposure to
obscene materials."' Despite the lack of studies finding a causal
link between harm to children and exposure to sexually oriented
material, the Court held that the state did not require scientific
certainty to support its position that "it was not irrational for the
legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the
statute [was] harmful to minors." 20 The Court therefore declined
to conclude that there was no rational basis for the statute.1
2
'
15 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639-40.
116 Id.
".. Id. at 635 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)).
118 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641-42.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 641.
"' Id. at 643. Justice Stewart concurred, arguing that just as the state can
limit a minor's right to contract, vote or marry based on lack of capacity, so
could the state place limits on a minor's right to sexually oriented materials,
even though that would be constitutionally impermissible for adults. Id. at
649-50 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Douglas, who was joined by Justice
Black, dissented on the grounds that the First Amendment was "designed to
keep the state and the hands of all state officials off the printing presses of
America .... " The dissent traced the history of obscenity laws back to the
crusade of iibermoralist Anthony Comstock and the resultant Federal Anti-
Obscenity Act of 1873 to conclude that any definition of obscenity was
"highly subjective, turning on the neurosis of the censor." In his view, the
only basis for the government to engage in censorship was a constitutional
amendment creating a national censorship authority. Cases such as Ginsberg
forced the Court into that role, and left censorship decisions to a group of
judges were supremely unqualified to act as a board of censors. Id. at 655-56
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Fortas added his own dissent, protesting that the Court had
abdicated its duty to decide whether the materials at issue in the case were
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Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, added another dimension to the
Court's approach to adolescents and sexual materials.'2 2 In
Pacifica, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) found
that a radio station's broadcast of a monologue by comedian
George Carlin entitled "Filthy Words" violated 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464, which prohibited a radio station from broadcasting
"obscene, indecent or profane language.' 23 The FCC decided
that the broadcast contained "patently offensive" language
relating to sexual and excretory activity, which could be
considered indecent within the meaning of the statute because it
was broadcast during the afternoon hours when children could
be exposed to it.
124
A plurality of the Supreme Court supported the FCC's
determination, finding that the monologue was indecent "as
broadcast" because (1) broadcasting received limited First
Amendment protection due to its "pervasive presence" in the
homes of the public; and (2) broadcasting was easily accessible
to children. 125 Relying on its prior decision in Ginsberg, the
Court confirmed that the government had a justifiable interest in
the "well-being of its youth" that supported this special
treatment of the broadcast medium. 126 Although the Court's
decision in Pacifica has recently come under renewed scrutiny, 12 7
the FCC continues to restrict the use of indecent language on the
rationale of harm to children.
The lower level of judicial scrutiny and the variable
obscene, using the rather slight excuse that counsel had failed to raise the
issue. He believed that the Court had overly expanded the power of the state
in an area that was the domain of the family, and the statute read so broadly
that it could equally apply to great works of art as to girlie magazines. Id. at
673-74 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
,22 Pacifica was cited by the Court in Fraser as justification for allowing
school officials to restrict speech considered vulgar or indecent. Bethel
School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 676 (1986); see also supra
note 54 and accompanying text.
,23 Pacifica v. F.C.C., 438 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1978).
124 Id. at 731-32.
125 Id. at 748-49.
126 Id. at 749-50.
127 See F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
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obscenity standard adopted by the Court in Ginsberg and
Pacifica combined with the misguided paternalism of Fraser -
appear to be an abdication of judicial scrutiny regarding
government control over exposure of minors to sexual
material.2 2 However, there now appears to be some question
regarding the continuing validity of the Pacifica decision. The
Court's recent decision, Fox v. FCC, held that the FCC's
adoption of a new policy forbidding the use of the "fleeting
expletive" in the broadcast context was neither arbitrary nor
capricious within the meaning of the Administrative Procedures
Act.'29 Although the Court did not reach the issue of the validity
of the FCC restrictions under the First Amendment, much was
said about it in concurrence and dissent. Justice Thomas wrote
separately to concur with the result, but questioned whether the
scarcity of broadcast frequencies and the accessibility of
broadcast materials to children justified application of the
Pacifica rational review standard. 3 ° Namely, Thomas argued
that broadcast frequencies were no longer in short supply as they
were when Pacifica was decided due to technological advances,
so there was no longer any justification for treating broadcast
stations any differently than other media.' 3
Further, Justice Thomas noted that the Court had more
recently refused to apply a lesser standard of First Amendment
scrutiny for broadcast speech in the context of telephone dial-in
services, cable television and the Internet. 1 2 Nor was broadcast
television the "uniquely pervasive" form of media it had once
"28 See S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs-Repression,
Rights and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REv.
119,154 (1995) ("The deferential approach set forth in Hazelwood is a virtual
abdication of the judicial obligation to protect the First Amendment rights of
students. ").
29 F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812
(2009) (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) of the Administrative Procedures
Act).
"0 Id. at 1820 (Thomas, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 1821.
132 Id. (citing Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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been due to the advent of the bundling of broadcast channels
with unregulated satellite and cable services, as well as the
ability to access programming through the Internet, cell phones
and other wireless devices.'33 He concluded that he was "open to
reconsideration of. . . Pacifica in the proper case. "'34
Justice Ginsburg joined the dissent of Justice Breyer, who
would have found the FCC's change in policy arbitrary and
capricious,13 but she wrote separately to note her disagreement
with the FCC's new policy, which could not "hide in the long
shadow the First Amendment casts . ,,136 Essentially,
Ginsberg appeared to agree with Thomas that there was no
longer any justification for restricting all speech on the basis of
spectrum scarcity, nor did all speech need to be restricted,
including that of adults, because of some vague threat of harm
to children.
Just as the basis for the Pacifica decision seems
anachronistic, Ginsberg has also been criticized on the basis
that its "brick and mortar" approach does not fit in an electronic
world.'37 One scholar examined the attempts by Congress to
protect children from indecent materials on the Internet and the
subsequent court decisions that found them unconstitutional. 3 '
Kevin Saunders observed that although the Court in these cases
found the government's interest in shielding children from
indecent materials compelling, the statute appeared insufficiently
tailored to that goal, because too much adult speech would be
filtered as well. He suggested several technological approaches
to address the problem. 39
Although Ginsberg and Pacifica have not been overruled,
they have been generally recognized as unsuitable to modern
"' Id. at 1822.
134 Id.
' Id. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 1828 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
137 Kevin W. Saunders, www.Sam'sStationery-andLuncheonette. com:
Bringing Ginsberg v. New York into the Internet Age, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1661, 1675 (2007).
18 See generally id.
,39 Id. at 1669-70.
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culture and technology. However, minors continue to have much
less freedom in the context of sexual expression, which makes
application of the First Amendment to sexting difficult, as the
following analysis will show.
IV. SEXTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Appropriate Constitutional Analysis for Sexting
The Constitutional implications of sexting by students in the
public school environment involve a complicated intersection
between the Tinker line of student speech cases and the
Ginsberg/Pacifica cases on obscenity/indecency as to minors, as
well the implications of the Ferber obscenity decision, which
held that child pornography is a category of obscene expression
unprotected by the First Amendment.' 40 No court has yet faced
this analytical minefield, leaving school administrators without
guidance when facing this relatively new phenomenon. It is no
wonder that the reaction of most administrators has apparently
been to refer the matter to the police so the administration is
relieved of any further responsibility. 14' However, administrators
are probably as divided as the courts when facing the issue of
how to respond to teenage sexuality and freedom of sexual
expression in schools. For example, the Ginsberg Court was
heavily divided on the variable obscenity standard as to minors
because the minority believed that defining obscenity is a
subjective task, and decisions regarding the exposure to or
tolerance of sexual materials are best left to parents. 142 On the
other hand, the Court has asserted that the public school system
has a duty to instill "habits and manners of civility" as well as
"teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior. ,1
43
Unfortunately, there is no simple, uniform response to the
'40 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
'41 See sources cited supra note 15.
142 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 656, 674 (1968) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
14' Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
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issue of sexting by students, which is precisely why a zero
tolerance approach-responding to student sexting by simply
turning the student over to the police, without evaluating the
constitutional considerations-is not the answer. Administrators
who are faced with sexting issues must balance many interests in
deciding what action to take, including the protection of students
from sexual exploitation or harm, the orderly conduct of the
school environment, and the preservation of students'
constitutional liberties. The following legal analysis is intended
as a guideline for the development of school policies in that
regard.
To determine whether a particular photograph in the
possession of a student deserves protection under the First
Amendment requires a multi-faceted inquiry: (1) has it disrupted
the educational mission of the school, promoted illegal and/or
dangerous activity in the context of a school-sponsored activity,
or been a public display of "vulgar and offensive" or "sexually
explicit, indecent or lewd" material; (2) if so, does it constitute
obscene material, such as child pornography, under an
applicable statute; (3) if not obscene under the adult standard,
does it fall within the obscenity as to minors prohibition under
an applicable statute? If the answer to the first query is "no,"
then even if the material would arguably constitute child
pornography, the administrator should err on the side of
protecting the minor's free expression rights, rather than putting
the child at risk for criminal liability. If the material meets any
of the foregoing criteria, then the administrator would not be
violating the minor's First Amendment rights by prohibiting the
expression and administering discipline for its presence in
school. It is advisable though that, in most circumstances, the
administrator issue such discipline not by turning the offending
material over to the authorities, but rather by turning it over to
the child's parents, who are better suited to determine what
material is or is not appropriate for their own child.
The first inquiry concerns the non-commercial possession or
distribution of pictures in a school setting where minors'
constitutional rights are not co-extensive with adults or even as
great as minors' rights outside of the school environment. The
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lesson from Tinker is that students do not lose their
constitutional rights upon entering the school grounds. 44 The
Tinker Court specifically held that "personal intercommunication
among students" was a protected activity if no disruption has
occurred. 145 However, sexually themed pictures on cell phones or
other devices do not typically constitute the kind of "pure"
political speech envisioned by the Tinker Court. One must then
determine whether possession or distribution of the picture
"materially disrupts classwork or involves disorder or invasion
of the rights of others . . . ."'46 If the picture has been created
and displayed voluntarily, there should be no claim of invasion
of personal rights by the student who is pictured. Further, if no
"disruption" occurs as a result of the viewing or distribution,
Tinker would arguably protect the activity.
Under these circumstances, administrative discipline would
only be appropriate if the possession or distribution of these
photographs fit into one of the exceptions to Tinker.147 The
exception most likely to apply in this scenario would be the one
carved out in Fraser,148 where it was held permissible to
discipline a student for lewd and vulgar sexual remarks during
an address to an assembly. 14 9 If such pictures are distributed to
an audience of students on school grounds or during a school-
sponsored event, administrators may arguably take action to
discipline the offenders under the Fraser exception. On the other
hand, if the picture is merely displayed on a student's cell
phone, perhaps to a limited number of fellow students, the
Fraser prohibition would not necessarily be applicable, nor
would it be desirable considering the importance of not unduly
restricting "personal intercommunication among students.",5
Accordingly, on the more innocuous end of the spectrum is
'" See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
145 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512
(1969).
'46 See supra Part II.A.
"41 See supra Part II.F.
141 See supra Part II.B.
149 id.
"0 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (internal citation omitted).
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the student who has his or her phone confiscated for use during
school hours and a prying teacher discovers racy photographs of
a fellow student on the phone."5 ' More egregious is the situation
where the boyfriend argues with his girlfriend and sends nude
photos intended solely for private use to the rest of the high
school student body, resulting in substantial disruption in
classes, as well as embarrassment to the girlfriend.'52 These two
scenarios arguably do not merit the same response, although
perpetrators in both such circumstances have been handed over
to the police and charged with possession or distribution of child
pornography.' Under this more appropriate policy, only the
latter of these circumstances would be subject to discipline, as
the communication would not warrant protection under the First
Amendment.
If the communication is not protected by the First
Amendment, the administrator would then need to determine
whether it constituted child pornography. It is well settled that
child pornography is a category of obscene material that does
not merit protection under the First Amendment. 5 4 What
constitutes child pornography must be properly defined under
state law, be limited to visual depictions of sexual conduct by
children below a certain age, the type of prohibited sexual
conduct must be adequately described, and the law must contain
an element of scienter."' The fact that a minor takes a
photograph of him or herself nude or semi-nude and sends it to
a friend should not typically justify prosecution under child
pornography laws, which are meant to shield children from adult
predators. However, that is a matter of prosecutorial discretion
because the majority of child pornography laws do not typically
' See Davies, supra note 15; Two Mason Teenagers Charged In
"Sexting" Case, supra note 15; text accompanying note 15.
.52 See Castalia Police Look Into Complaint of Nude Photos Sent By Cell
Phone, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
' See Davies, supra note 15; Two Mason Teenagers Charged In
'Sexting' Case, supra note 15; Castalia Police Look Into Complaint of Nude
Photos Sent By Cell Phone, supra note 15.
"4 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
.I Id. at 764-65 (footnote omitted).
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differentiate between minors who produce or possess the photos
and adults.
For example, under the New York statute prohibiting child
pornography upheld by the Court in Ferber, sexual conduct was
defined as "actual or simulated intercourse, deviate sexual
intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic
abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals" involving a child
under sixteen.16 The Pennsylvania statute at issue in the sexting
case similarly defined child pornography in those terms for
minors under eighteen. 57
If the conduct depicted in the pictures does not meet the
sexual conduct definition of the state's child pornography
statute-i.e., it does not show sexual activity or genitalia-the
material is not obscene as to adults under Ferber. However, that
does not necessarily mean the pictures are protected by the First
Amendment. The variable obscenity standard adopted by
Ginsberg holds that materials not considered obscene as to adults
could nevertheless be considered obscene as to minors, and thus
subject to control. '58 Therefore, a state statute can arguably hold
children who voluntarily and non-commercially exchange
photographs-which would not fit the definition of child
pornography-to a different standard than adults and survive
constitutional scrutiny, which was the subject of the Ginsberg
decision.'59 On the other hand, if such exchange is voluntary and
non-commercial, it would arguably be protected under the First
Amendment. No court has addressed this issue as of yet.
B. Why Zero Tolerance Of Sexting Is Poor Policy
While the Ginsberg Court held that despite a lack of
scientific certainty, it was not irrational to conclude that
exposure to sexual materials is harmful to minors, ' 6° such
6 Id. at 751.
' ' Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637-38 (M.D. Penn.
2009) (citing 18 PENN. STAT. § 6312 (2008)).
"' See supra Part HI.
59 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 629 (1968).
160 Id. at 641-43.
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communications are arguably a typical and vital aspect of normal
• . 161
sexual development. Citing numerous law review articles on
both sides of this issue, the Court deferred to the collective
wisdom of the state legislature in regards to shielding minors
from pornography. 62 However, minors do not suddenly develop
their sexuality upon reaching the magic age of eighteen or
graduating from high school. It is a process that begins at birth
and continues throughout childhood as they go through various
physical and mental developments. 163 Sexual behavior that is
common among children from ages seven to twelve includes
"[1]ooking at pictures of naked or partially naked people" and
"[v]iewing/listening to sexual content in media . . . ." ' If this
is normal behavior in grade school children, our society should
not be shocked by the same behavior in high school students
who have passed the age of puberty. As far back as 1953, the
Kinsey Report found that forty-five percent of women and fifty-
seven percent of men had engaged in some kind of sexual play
by age twelve. 65 More recent studies found even higher
percentages of early sexual activity. 166 Therefore, adopting a zero
16' See, e.g., THE NATIONAL CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK,
SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN: INFORMATION FOR
PARENTS AND CAREGIVERS 1-3 (2009), available at http://nctsn.org/nctsn-
assets/pdfs/caring/sexualdevelopmentandbehavior.pdf.
162 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642 n.10.
163 See, e.g., The National Child Traumatic Stress Network, supra note
161, at 1-3.
' Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
165 Dana M. Northcraft, Book Review, A Nation Scared: Children, Sex,
and the Denial of Humanity: A Review Essay on Judith Levine's Harmful to
Minors: The Perils of Protecting Children from Sex, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER
Soc. POL'Y & L. 483, n.24 (2004) (citing ROBERT CROOKS & KARLA BAUR,
OUR SEXUALITY 383 (6th ed. 1996)).
'66 Id. Northcraft discusses how Levine links the modem moral panic
over minor sexuality to the unusual confluence of two radically different
groups: the religious right and sexually conservative feminists, who joined
forces in response to the 1986 Meese Commission. Id. at 494. The religious
right contends that sex is only permissible in the context of marriage and
supports abstinence-only sex education. Id. at 494-95. The "sex-conservative
feminists" raise concerns about sexual abuse, which resulted in increased
concerns about sexual abuse of children. Id. at 496. Further, the 1986 Meese
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tolerance approach to such perfectly natural human behavior is
irrational and unrealistic.
Furthermore, the uncertainty concerning the constitutionality
of sexting in public schools makes a zero tolerance approach
perilous at best. Zero tolerance policies have come under
increasing scrutiny because of their ineffectiveness. Zero
tolerance is understood as a policy "that applies a prescribed,
mandatory sanction for an infraction-typically expulsion or
suspension-with minimal, if any, consideration of the
circumstances or consequences of the offense . ,,167 The
result of these policies has not been a decrease in crime, but a
rise in student expulsions.' 68 School crime rates have been stable
for twenty years, while suspensions have almost doubled during
that time. 69 Consequently, not only are these policies ineffective
in reducing crime, but they have led to an increase in juvenile
prosecutions due to the requirement that these students be
referred to law enforcement.' 70 Further, a comprehensive study
by Harvard University "concluded that the policy is unfair,
breeds distrust and confrontations between students and teachers
and denies core educational and developmental needs of
students." Accordingly, the profound long-term impact of
Commission "conclud[ed] that pornography was tantamount to violence
against women." Id. at 497 (internal citation omitted). Thus both groups have
impacted public opinion and legislative policy with the result that mainstream
sex and reproductive health advocacy groups have been compromised in their
work. Id. at 497-98.
167 Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilson, One Strike and You're Out?
Constitutional Restraints on Zero Tolerance in Public Education, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 65, 68 (2003). The advent of zero-tolerance policies is traced to the
federal Gun Free Schools Act of 1994, which required states to adopt
mandatory expulsion policies for students caught with weapons in school, as
well as referral to law enforcement. All fifty states enacted the required
policy in order to retain federal funding, but a majority of states extended
zero-tolerance to other school infractions, such as the use of drugs, alcohol
and tobacco, sometimes even if the behavior occurred outside of school
grounds.
'6' Id. at 71.
169 id.
170 Id. at 74.
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denying an education to millions of students is not justified by
zero tolerance policies that have not been proven effective.171
Not only has the social utility of zero tolerance been questioned,
but its constitutionality has been challenged as well.'72 As
previously observed by the Court, one cannot reasonably expect
school administrators to master such legal nuances.173 A better
solution lies in a policy that prioritizes its students' free
expression rights such that students are protected from
unnecessary harms.
CONCLUSION
The application of zero tolerance policies to First
Amendment expression that neither unduly disrupts the school
environment, nor constitutes child pornography, is a
disproportionate approach that negatively affects minors and a
society that purports to obey the maxim: "let the punishment fit
the crime. "7 4
171 Id. at 86.
172 See id. at 87-116 (discussing thoroughly the constitutional right to an
education). For example, one commentator asserts that a school policy
banning students from possessing contraceptives or other legal medications is
a violation of a student's right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Elisabeth Frost, Note & Comment, Zero Privacy: Schools are Violating
Students' Fourteenth Amendment Right of Privacy Under the Guise of
Enforcing Zero Tolerance Policies, 81 WASH. L. REV. 391, 393-94 (2006).
Another commentator has noted that although such constitutional challenges
to zero tolerance based on substantive and procedural due process are
unlikely to succeed unless the school action is "wholly arbitrary," zero
tolerance policies are ineffective, and cause children to lose educational
opportunities, subjecting them to psychological trauma, and often, the adult
criminal justice system. Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspending and
Expelling Children From Educational Opportunity: Time to Reevaluate Zero
Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1039, 1073-74 (2001).
"' See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
174 Although this exact phrase is properly attributed to a line from a song
in The Mikado by Gilbert and Sullivan. See WIKIPEDIA, THE MIKADo/A
MORE HUMANE MIKADO (Mar. 5, 2009), http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The-
Mikado/Amore-humaneMikado, the concept has been embodied in law
since the Code of Hammurabi. WIKPEDIA, RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (Jan. 21,
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The notion that "indecent" materials are harmful to minors
but not adults is the dominant theme that has run through court
decisions since Ginsberg. However, even Ginsberg recognized
that there was no evidence supporting such a stance.'75 In light of
our knowledge regarding human sexuality, 7 6 the idea that
legislatures have the right to place arbitrary majoritarian moral
restrictions on adults and youth under the doctrine of in loco
parentis seems increasingly anachronistic, as well as unrealistic
in light of the facts.
As Justice Alito advocated in Morse, it is dangerous for
school administrators to assume that they act in place of a
student's parents when a child attends school. 1' Public schools
are part of state government and operate under the same
Constitutional constraints as any other organ of the state, except
to the extent authorized by the Tinker exceptions. ' It is
particularly inappropriate that the state exert parental control
over the sensitive area of teenage sexuality. The parents of the
Pennsylvania teenagers in Skumanick illustrate how parental
views can be vastly different from those of state authorities.' 79
However, if schools are truly acting in loco parentis, as
Justice Thomas asserted,8 ° they should be kind and loving
parents who appreciate the stresses of adolescent development
and remember what it was like when they first passed a love
note in class. The majority of pictures adolescents are sending
each other are no more than visual love notes, as the teen survey
indicates. 1" It would be a harsh parent indeed who threw their
child into the remorseless jaws of the criminal justice system for
harmless sexual experimentation. The better practice is for
school administrators to contact the student's parents with the
information and allow such personal choices to be made by
2009), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Retributive-justice.
175 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
"n Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
178 id.
179 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
"o Morse, 551 U.S. at 413 (Thomas, J., concurring).
s ' See supra Part I.
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those whose responsibility it is to make these decisions. If the
activity causes disruption or harm to another student,
disciplinary action should be taken within the confines of the
school system. If students, or their parents, want to take further
action, they can make the decision to pursue a civil or criminal
remedy on their own.
In response to the hypothetical posed at the beginning of this
article, a reasonable school administrator should never turn the
child over to the police and risk stigmatizing them for the rest of
their lives unless there is real evidence of child abuse or
pedophilia, in which case the child needs protection, not
prosecution. On no account should an administrator make copies
of the picture, for whatever reason, or risk being faced with
child pornography charges like the hapless well-meaning
administrator in Virginia. 1 2 Forcing the student into a re-
education program could subject the school to a lawsuit by the
students and parents for compelled speech in violation of the
First Amendment like the prosecutor in Pennsylvania." What is
left is option A: instruct the student to turn off the phone for use
during school hours because the student arguably has a First
Amendment right to the material on his or her phone. Further,
just as any teenager of an older generation would have been
mortified to have their paper love notes read aloud, so should
the present generation be given respect for their privacy.
IS? See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
183 See supra Part I.
737

